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Abstract
Much attention in recent years has turned to the potential of behavioural insights
to improve the performance of government policy. One behavioural concept of in-
terest is the effect of a cash transfer label on how the transfer is spent. The Winter
Fuel Payment (WFP) is a labelled cash transfer to offset the costs of keeping older
households warm in the winter. Previous research has shown that households spend
a higher proportion of the WFP on energy expenditures due to its label (Beatty et al.,
2011). If households interpret the WFP as money for their energy bills, it may re-
duce their willingness to undertake investments which help achieving the same goal,
such as the adoption of renewable energy technologies. In this paper we show that
the WFP has distortionary effects on the renewable technology market. Using the
sharp eligibility criteria of the WFP in a Regression Discontinuity Design, this anal-
ysis finds a reduction in the propensity to install renewable energy technologies of
around 2.7 percentage points due to the WFP. This is a considerable number. It im-
plies that 62% of households (whose oldest member turns 60) would have invested in
renewable energy but refrain to do so after receiving the WFP. This analysis suggests
that the labelling effect spreads to products related to the labelled good. In this case,
households use too much energy from sources which generate pollution and too little
from relatively cleaner technologies.
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1 Introduction
Many governments have started to incorporate the lessons of behavioral economics
in their policies. These behavioral interventions (or “nudges”) are characterized by their
non-pecuniary nature. Behavioral approaches include appeals to social norms (Allcott,
2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013), commitment devices, information provision, small price
changes (Homonoff, 2013), default options and cash transfer labels (Beatty and Tuttle,
2012). The attractiveness of these interventions lies in the fact that they are simple and in-
expensive to implement, but at the same time produce considerable changes in behaviour.
Nudges have been found to be successful in a variety of settings, improving healthy and
pro-social behaviors (Gine´ et al., 2010), adoption of better technologies (Duflo et al.,
2011) and saving rates (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).
The labelling of cash transfers has attracted the attention of economists in recent
years. Labelled cash transfers are unconditional to specific uses, but have been given a
suggestive name which may nudge recipients into socially desirable behaviors. Example
of these types of transfers are child benefits or food stamps (e.g., Kooreman, 2000; Blow
et al., 2012). The literature typically studies the effectiveness of the label in promoting
desired behaviors and stress the theoretical implications from an economic point of view.
Standard economics would predict unconditional labelled cash transfer to be equivalent to
a unlabelled cash transfer. However, some evidence exists showing that labelled transfers
seem to be spent more than proportionally on the items suggested by the label (e.g., Beatty
and Tuttle, 2012; Kooreman, 2000).
One such unconditional cash transfer policy is the UK Winter Fuel Payment (WFP).
The WFP was initiated to combat the excess elderly winter mortality and morbidity as-
2
sociated with cold indoor climates. It provides households, which have a member 60 or
older (in the qualifying week of a given year), with a lump sum annual payment. The
WFP is not means tested nor is it mandated that the payment be spent on fuel. Though the
WFP transfers cash that could be utilised for any expenditure, the label of the transfer in-
duces households to use a larger portion of it to pay their energy bills than a non-labelled
transfer (Beatty et al., 2011). The rationale for this behaviour is based on the framework
of mental accounting (Thaler, 1990). Households assign their income to categories of
expenditure, thus when income is received that is labelled, it is assigned into the labelled
category.
This paper builds upon Beatty et al. (2011) and relates to the literature of uncondi-
tional cash transfers. However, it is not concerned with the direct effect of the label on the
good suggested, but asks whether labels alter decisions on products related to the good
suggested. We investigate the effect of the WFP on the renewables market. Renewables
are clean technologies with the potential to achieve the same goal set by the WFP, i.e.,
keeping elderly warm in winter, while reducing the negative externalities from emissions.
The motivation for the WFP to alter renewable energy investments suggested here is that
households become less sensitive to energy expenditures, they feel that the energy mental
account is satisfied and options to reduce this expenditure would not be considered.
Our analysis shows that the WFP has an unintended consequence of reducing the
propensity to install renewable technologies. The sharp eligibility criteria of the WFP
allows for an estimation of the casual impact of the WFP on the propensity to install re-
newable energy with a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Because estimates from
the RDD are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth size and functional form, we present
various combinations between different bandwidths (6, 8 and 10) and functional forms
(linear, quadratic and cubic). Further, we also allow the slope of the relationship between
renewable energy installment and age to be different on either side of the cut-off age of
60. Results consistently find a negative effect of the WFP on the propensity to install
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renewables. Models with optimal functional forms as established by goodness-of-fit tests
and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), show that WFP recipients are around 2.7 per-
centage points less likely to install renewable energy technologies. This drop corresponds
to 62% of households substituting away from renewable investments just after receiving
the payment. Given the universality of the WFP this is a considerable distortion. We
restricted our sample to homeowners only, as they are more likely to make investments,
however results still hold when considering renters too, albeit the size of the effect is
smaller. The effect is larger for households, which do not contain members under the age
of 45. Falsification tests show that the WFP has either increased or had no effect on the
propensity to invest in one’s home through remodelling their kitchen or purchase other
consumer durables such as a car. Additionally, placebo WFP eligibility ages generally do
not find statistical changes in the propensity to install renewables. This analysis extends
the literature on labelling cash transfers by showing that greater consideration should be
given to the choice of the specific label when decisions on related products are impor-
tant to maximising the net social benefits of policies ( i.e., in presence of externalities).
By looking at the potential distortionary effects on renewables market our paper is the
first one to estimate the indirect effects of a labelled cash transfer payment. This paper
also shows that indirect effects are especially important in a context in which negative
externalities are pervasive and policies that seems at first effective, may ultimately lead to
socially inefficient outcomes.
The impact of the WFP label on renewable energy investment is particularly con-
cerning given current UK energy policy. The UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC)
has outlined ambitious goals for improved household energy efficiency and uptake of re-
newable energy technologies. The scenario envisioned by the CCC for the UK to meet
their carbon budgets requires substantial savings from the building sector. As a result of
these climate change-driven energy goals, increased concern over the security of energy
supplies and competitiveness of the UK economy, a number of high profile energy saving
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policies have been implemented in the last 5 years. Many target the residential sector,
such as the Green Deal and Feed-in Tariff Scheme. These policies are designed to make
it easier for citizens to recognize the future benefits of energy efficient choices and reduce
the upfront cost of installing energy efficient and/or renewable technologies. The research
here reveals that the WFP payment is in conflict with the goals of UK energy policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a
conceptual framework on the relationship between the WFP and household’s installation
of renewable energy. Section three describes the data, while Section four details the
empirical strategy. Sections five and six discuss the results and associated robustness
checks, respectively. Section seven studies results for different groups of households, and
Section eight concludes the study.
2 Background
The WFP was initiated in 1997 by the UK government as a means to reduce excess
winter morbidity and mortality in the elderly. At the time, the UK had one of the highest
rates of winter mortality in the Europe. Initially the payment was £20 per household, but
in 2001 it increased to £200, and it has stayed at that level since then, although some
years included extra one-time payments. Households who have a member who is 60 or
older at the beginning of the qualifying week are eligible to receive the WFP. Households
who have not previously registered with the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP),
the agency that manages the WFP, have to fill out a form to receive the payment. Those
that have previously registered will automatically receive the payment. Once a household
is in receipt of the WFP, it continues to be paid until the DWP is notified of a change in
circumstance that makes the household no longer eligible for the payment. The placement
of the qualifying week has changed over time, however during the years in our data the
qualifying week came in September. Important for this analysis is that the WFP is not
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means tested and all households that are 60 or above at the qualifying week receive the
payment. This aspect of the WFP has proved quite controversial as many fuel poverty and
austerity groups argue that the WFP should be altered to help the fuel poor exclusively.
A simple model where the household demands energy services (e.g., heating) through
a use of energy (e.g., electricity) and capital (e.g., renewable technologies) is utilized to
show how the WFP could affect household decisions around renewable energy technolo-
gies. It is assumed that the household maximizes the production of energy services sub-
ject to a budget constraint for energy services.1 The household’s production of energy
services is assumed to follow a Cobb-Douglas production funcation and can be modeled
using isoquant and isocost curves, which show the household’s ability to purchase energy
or capital that limits the production of energy services attainable.2 In this setting, higher
levels of capital imply lower levels of energy used for a given level of energy services.
Standard economic theory assumes that income or cash is always fungible: any unit of
money can be substitute for another and that the source of income does not matter for
rational consumers. A direct consequence of this is that labelling of income sources,
cash or cash-equivalents (such as vouchers) should not yield any sizeable and statistically
significant effect on spending choices. In other words, standard economic theory would
predict that the WFP is seen as income. The household increases the use of both capital
and energy to produce more enegy services in this case due to the WFP being an increase
in income. In this case, the WFP would lead to a little rightward shift of the isocost curve
as in Figure 1.
However, recent literature shows that money with a label attached is treated like a
price subsidy to the labelled good. Conceptually, this is a violation of the fungibility as-
sumption and can be explained by the mental accounting framework proposed by Thaler
in several works (e.g., Thaler, 1990, 2004). In this framework, individuals are thought
1The household has also a budget for all other goods such as foods, cloths. So, the budget constraint for
energy services is a part of overall budget constraint for all goods the household consumes.
2An isocost curve here can be considered as a budget line for energy services.
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to use simple heuristics to make financial and consumption decisions. In particular, indi-
viduals have mental budgets for different expenditure categories (food, clothes, education
and, say, energy or energy related matters) that they treat separately. So when in receipt
of labelled cash transfers, the money is used disproportionately more to purchase goods
suggested by the label. Use of mental accounting implies that the household may treat
the WFP as a price subsidy to energy, which would pivot out of the isocost curve to allow
more energy to be used as in Figure 2. In this case, the sign of the effect of the WFP on
capital (i.e. renewable technologies) depends on the relative strength of the substitution
effect and the income effect. If the substitution effect (towards energy and away from cap-
ital) dominates the output effect, less capital is used and vice versa. To summarise, our
simple model predicts that households will reduce their investment in renewable energy
only if the WFP is seen as a price subsidy to energy (and the substitution effect is stronger
than the output effect). This refutable implication is taken to the data to determine if it
has empirical validity.
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Figure 1: Impact of the WFP as income on use of energy and capital
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Figure 2: Impact of the WFP as a price subsidy to energy on use of energy and capital
Examples of households’ use of mental accounting can be found in development,
agricultural and financial economics, using clean identification strategies or natural field
experiments. Abeler and Marklein (2008) shows that individuals change consumption
according to the suggestion of the label in a field experiment conducted in a restaurant.
Food stamps, a cash-equivalent benefit that can be exchanged for food, have also being
studied extensively. The results are mixed with observational studies showing that the
fungibility assumption is usually violated, while experimental evidence would suggest
that agents act rationally. A recent paper by Beatty and Tuttle (2012), using a clean
identification strategy, shows that an exogenous large increase in food stamp benefits
caused households to increase food-at-home expenditure as well as increase households’
share of total expenditure allocated towards food-at-home expenditure. A recent paper
found that the cash incentives to education that are labelled, but not conditional on school
attendance, performs as well as more expensive conditional cash transfers in Morocco
(Benhassine et al., 2013). The paper closest to the current resarch is Beatty et al. (2011),
which estimates the effect of the WFP on share of total expenditure spent on fuel, holding
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total expenditure constant. Beatty et al. (2011) finds that non-labeled transfers generally
lead to a 3 percent increase in energy expenditures while the WFP has led to between a
13 and 60 percent increase. No other expenditure category was significantly affected by
receiving the WFP.
The prediction of our model when households use mental accounting implies that the
WFP label has distortionary effects on the renewables market, decreasing the propensity
to install these technologies. Should the WFP lead to less renewable energy investment, it
would imply that the label of the WFP leads households to see a lower price of energy and
thus substitute away from renewables and towards more energy usage. In this scenario,
the WFP would lead (indirectly) to a socially inefficient outcome, namely an equilibrium
in which a given indoor temperature is obtained with too much pollution. This outcome
is also of concern because indoor temperatures can be kept at comfortable levels by em-
ploying different strategies (or combination of those), some of which are more socially
optimal than just switching the heater on. Some of these alternative strategies include
improving energy efficiency and/or installing renewable technologies at home.
3 Data
This analysis utilizes household level micro-datasets of a representative sample of
the UK population. The first dataset is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) Wave
18. The BHPS is a longitudinal survey covering on average 12,000 individuals and more
than 5,000 households from 1991 to 2009, providing both individual and household-level
information on a large variety of variables. Wave 18 of the BHPS is the last wave and
sampled individuals in 2008 and 2009. The second dataset is the Understanding Society
Survey (USS), which replaced the BHPS. We use the first wave of the USS, which was
collected in 2010 and2011. Most of the analyses will focus only on households which
own their home, though an estimation using all households is also given below.
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Both waves of the BHPS and USS ask the household whether they have installed
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, solar water heaters or a micro wind turbine.3 A variable
y is created that equals one if any of the three renewable technologies have been installed
and is zero otherwise. Solar PV systems are mounted on the roofs to produce electricity
that is either used by the household or exported to the transmission grid. The generation
that is used by the household reduces its expenditure on energy. According to the Energy
Savings Trust, a typical solar PV system will generate up to 75 percent of a household’s
electricity needs. Any excess may be sold back to the grid.4 Similar arguments hold
for micro-wind turbines, which can generate up to three times the average household’s
electricity consumption, and solar water heaters, which save around £70 a year.
Given the eligibility requirement of the WFP discussed above, a sharp RDD requires
that the assignment variable, denoted by x, be observable. Here, x is the age of the oldest
member of the household during the month of September in the year of the survey. The
data provides the month and year of birth as well as the month and year of the survey. As
we do not have any data on whether households receive the WFP, it is crucial to remove
any measurement error in x, especially at 60.5 Using this data, we construct x in the
following way,
x =

SY −BY if 1 ≤ BM < 9 and 10 ≤ SM ≤ 12
SY −BY − 1 if 1 ≤ BM < 9 and 1 ≤ SM < 9
SY −BY − 1 if 10 ≤ BM ≤ 12 and 1 ≤ SM ≤ 12,
where SY and BY denote survey year and birth year respectively, and SM and BM
denote survey month and birth month respectively. We assign 1, 2, 3, . . . , 12, to both
3Other waves of the BHPS and USS do not contain these questions.
4During our sample period there were no government subsidy payments available for generation from
these renewable.
5Otherwise, we could have applied the fuzzy RDD with the measurement error in x (Battistin et al.,
2009).
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SM and BM , where 1 means January and 12 means December. Thus, in the first case,
x = SY − BY if the oldest member of a household was born from January to August
and surveyed from October to December.6 For other combinations of BM and SM , we
subtract 1 from SY − BY . This adjustment is undertaken to ensure the eligibility of
households. In the first case, the oldest members aged 60 years old are considered as 60,
but in the second and third cases, they are considered as 59 because they are not eligible
for the WFP.
The assignment variable, x, is used to create a discontinuity dummy, D, which is
equal to one if the oldest member of a household is 60 or older (and thus eligible for the
WFP) and is zero otherwise (e.g. D = 1{x ≥ 60}). As the take up of the WFP is above
90% according to Beatty et al. (2011), we consider D as a treatment dummy too where
1 implies that a household receives the WFP and 0 otherwise. In this way, we consider
the sharp RDD where the probability of treatment or receiving the WFP, Pr(D = 1|x), is
sharply discontinuous at 60.
To have an idea about the discontinuity in the propensity of renewable energy in-
stallments around the cutoff age of 60, Table 1 shows the distribution of households that
own houses (number of observations) and means of y by age cell in x and year of the
survey. The regression analyses are based on a bandwidth of 10 or narrower. It is clear
that the majority of observations come from 2009 and 2010 with many fewer households
in 2011. As age increases, the number of observations declines a bit in each year of the
sample, suggesting an increase in the mortality rate with age. In general, the mean of y
is small in every age-year cell, however the total column reveals that the overall mean of
y increases with age up to 59, and then declines before increasing again after 65. This
pattern indicates that as age increases, households increasingly consider renewable en-
ergy installment. After receiving the WFP, the propensity to install renewable energy falls
6The eligibility criterion for the WFP is that the oldest member of a household turns into 60 before a
given date in September. As the data has no information about day or week of birth, we do not know the
eligibility of households with the oldest members born in September. We drop those households.
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Table 1: Probability of renewable energy installment by age-year of the survey cell
x
2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
y Obs. y Obs. y Obs. y Obs. y Obs.
50 0.0207 145 0 205 0.016 188 0 20 0.0108 558
51 0.0083 120 0.0041 241 0 194 0 17 0.0035 572
52 0 93 0.0087 231 0.0214 187 0 11 0.0115 522
53 0 113 0.0039 254 0.0226 177 0 14 0.009 558
54 0 125 0.0092 217 0.0106 188 0 11 0.0074 541
55 0.0172 116 0.0093 214 0.0122 164 0 9 0.0119 503
56 0.0076 132 0 210 0.0231 173 0.0769 13 0.0114 528
57 0 101 0.0097 206 0.0106 188 0 11 0.0079 506
58 0 90 0.0091 220 0.0061 163 0.1 20 0.0101 493
59 0.0174 115 0.0195 205 0.046 174 0 14 0.0276 508
60 0.008 125 0.0215 186 0.0174 172 0 20 0.0159 503
61 0.0074 136 0.0041 245 0.0144 209 0 12 0.0083 602
62 0.0165 121 0.0161 249 0.0092 217 0 8 0.0134 595
63 0.0095 105 0.0053 188 0.0047 215 0 15 0.0057 523
64 0.0198 101 0.0145 207 0.0062 162 0 12 0.0124 482
65 0.0097 103 0 194 0.0058 173 0 11 0.0042 481
66 0.0341 88 0.0164 183 0.0411 146 0 15 0.0278 432
67 0 99 0.0179 168 0.0169 178 0 11 0.0132 456
68 0.0198 101 0 172 0.0072 139 0.0769 13 0.0094 425
69 0.0112 89 0.0286 175 0.0142 141 0 8 0.0194 413
70 0 98 0.0261 153 0.0318 157 0 7 0.0217 415
initially and then increases from 66 and on. This provides first evidence that y might be
discontinuous at 60 and that the WFP might have an affect on the probability of renewable
energy installment.
4 Empirical Approach
The eligibility criterion based on age allows for an estimation of the causal effects
of the WFP on renewable energy installations using a sharp RDD. Assignment to the
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treatment is determined exogenously by the age of the oldest member in the qualifying
week in September. Thus, households will be either treated by the WFP if eligible (e.g.,
the age of the oldest member is greater than or equal to 60 in September of the given year)
or non-treated if not eligible (e.g., the age of the oldest member is below 60), where the
cutoff point is age of 60. Hence, selection on the treatment is on the basis of observable
age of the oldest member in the qualifying month, which is independent of the outcome
and cannot be manipulated.
The empirical specification will then compare households who are immediately
above and below the eligibility age with the identifying assumption that these households
with similar observed and unobserved characteristics would have behaved similarly with
respect to renewable energy installation in the absence of WFP receipt. In other words,
this assumption ensures that households on the left-hand side of the cutoff represent a
good counter factual. Now, let ρ denote the causal effect of WFP on the probability of
renewable energy installment; for small  > 0 a formal representation of the causal effect
can be given by the following equation:
ρ = lim
→0
E(y|x = x0 + )− E(y|x = x0 − ). (1)
Given the assumption reported above, any jump in the propensity of renewable en-
ergy installment at the threshold of 60 years of age is brought about by the discontinuity
in the WFP. The causal effect can be interpreted as the average treatment effect (ATE) of
the WFP program on the propensity of installing renewable energy of households near the
cutoff point.
Figure 3 shows the probability of installing renewable energy, y, against the age
of the oldest household member, x, – the assignment variable. Each point represents
the propensity of installing renewable energy technology for a particular age-year of the
survey cell (i.e., they are not single observations). The line is estimated from a non-
13
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Figure 3: Discontinuity in renewable energy installment at age 60 (Predicted line from
series estimator)
parametric series estimator (Li and Racine, 2007). It passes through means by age-year
and provides an indication of the discontinuity in the probability of installing renewable
energy at the cutoff age of 60. The size of discontinuity is the ATE of the WFP program
on the probability of installing renewable energy. The estimated line in the figure shows
the expected shape as seen from Table 1. The scattered points in the graph help in identi-
fying the presence of some outliers, which may drive the magnitude of the discontinuity.
However, in Table 1 there are outliers only in year 2011 when there are few observations,
alleviating concerns about outliers effecting our results.
Intuitively, one way of estimating the causal effect would be to run two separate re-
gressions: one for the left-had side of the cutoff and one for the right-hand side. A more
direct way of estimating the ATE, and one that is typically used in the literature, is to
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run a pooled regression on both sides of the cutoff. This has the advantage of obtaining
the standard errors of the causal effects directly. Figure 3 shows that there are different
shapes of the predicted lines on either side the discontinuity point. To allow for different
functional forms on either side of the cutoff, a regression model should include interaction
terms between the treatment indicator and the assignment variable and its polynomial or-
ders. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we present the RDD equation in the polynomial
form:
y = α+β1(x−60)+· · ·+βk(x−60)k+δ1D∗(x−60)+· · ·+δkD∗(x−60)k+ρD+η, (2)
where y is a dummy variable indicating whether the household has installed renewable
technologies at home, and the coefficient, ρ, is the parameter of the causal effect of the
WFP. The assignment variable is normalized by subtracting 60 from x, because this nor-
malization gives a guarantee that the coefficient on D is still a causal effect in the case
of interactions between D and the assignment variable and its polynomial forms (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009).
It follows from this, that there are two important choices to be made in the RDD
framework: the bandwidth around the sharp eligibility threshold and the order of the
polynomial of x− 60 (k here). Incorrectly specifying equation (2) would lead to a biased
estimate of the ATE. With regard to the size of the bandwidth, note that as the bandwidth
becomes larger, more data is considered, however households at either end of the spectrum
are less likely to have similar observed and unobserved characteristics. Therefore, much
wider bandwidths may give biased results of a causal effect. Narrower bandwidths, on
the other hand, may reduce the precision of the regression model. For this reason, we
employ the cross validation method of optimal bandwidth selection, suggested by Imbens
and Lemieux (2008), which balances between bias and precision.
The order of the polynomial represents the shape of the preferences for installing re-
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newable energy as age changes. While the assumption is that the preferences are smooth,
this does not provide guidance as to the correct order of polynomial. Following Lee
and Card (2008), the optimal polynomial order for the functional form is chosen with a
goodness-of-fit test. The specification choice procedure is to add a higher order term to
the polynomial until the age cell dummies are no longer jointly significant. The optimal
polynomial order selection does not vary when using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).
In spite of using the optimal bandwidth and/or the optimal polynomial order, the
ATE estimation will be biased if the identification assumption does not hold. The identi-
fication assumption – the local randomisation assumption – states that both observed and
unobserved covariates that affect the outcome are continuous at the cutoff age, 60. These
covariates are predetermined and unaffected by the WFP program. For instance, when the
forcing variable is age it is typical to worry about changes in employment status. Here,
60 is the women retirement age in the UK. In order to check for the validity of our design,
we will be testing for the presence of discontinuities in observed covariates. The absence
of any significant discontinuity will be taken as reassurance that local randomisation is an
appropriate assumption.
5 Results
Table 2 shows the estimated values of ρ from the OLS regressions of equation (2)
under three different bandwidths (6, 8 and 10) and three orders of polynomials (linear,
quadratic and cubic). Each model includes year dummies to control for year of the survey.
Reported t-ratios are estimated from age-cluster adjusted standard errors. According to
the cross validation method, the optimal bandwidth is 10 (for details see Figure A.1 in
Appendix). The table shows which polynomial performs better after our goodness-of-fit
test and AIC.
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Table 2: The effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment
Bandwidth
Models without interaction Models with interaction
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.0076*a -0.0076* -0.0078 -0.0080* -0.0129* -0.0213**
[-1.8159] [-1.8025] [-1.3834] [-1.8717] [-1.9048] [-2.0652]
8 -0.0064 -0.0068 -0.0105 -0.0075 -0.0176** -0.0267***a
[-0.9177] [-0.9881] [-1.0191] [-1.1089] [-2.2901] [-4.3267]
6 -0.0103 -0.0107 -0.0038 -0.0121 -0.0179** -0.0509***a
[-1.1680] [-1.2453] [-0.3139] [-1.5302] [-2.5025] [-16.0693]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors at age level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a Optimal polynomial orders of x − 60 according to the goodness of fit test suggested by Lee and Card
(2008) and AIC.
The optimal bandwidth is equal to 10 according to the cross validation method suggested by Imbens and
Lemieux (2008).
The sample is restricted to owners only. Year of the survey dummies are included in each regression.
The discontinuity parameters are all negative. The majority of these parameters are
statistically significant in specifications with interactions (between x − 60 and its poly-
nomial terms, and D). Only linear models under 8 and 6 bandwidths show insignificant
results. However, visual and formal tests of functional form indicate that the linear ap-
proximation is not the most appropriate in this case (see Figure 3 and Lee and Card (2008)
and AIC tests in Appendix). Figure 3 shows not only that the probability of renewable
energy installment has a non-linear trend but also different shapes on either side of the
cutoff age. This strongly suggests that the specifications with interactions are the most
appropriate. Within these models, the narrower the bandwidth, and the higher the order
of polynomials, the larger is the estimated parameter. Looking only at statistically sig-
nificant results of models with optimal polynomial order (i.e., linear with bandwidth 10
or cubic with bandwidth 8 or 6), the value of the discontinuity ranges between -0.008
and -0.05. According to the cubic specification, which is optimal in 2 out of 3 cases, the
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values are higher on average and more stable, ranging from -0.02 and -0.05. Using the
middle point of both these latter ranges suggest that receiving the WFP leads reduces the
propensity to install renewable technologies by 2.7 percentage points. A more conser-
vative estimate is provided by the quadratic specification, which estimated decline in the
probability of renewables installment ranges between 1.2-1.8 percentage points.
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Figure 4: Discontinuity in renewable energy installment from estimated models in Table
2
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the estimated effects using a band-
width of 10. Every specification have a discontinuous jump down at the age of 60. This
provides further evidence that households who are in receipt of the WFP are less likely to
install renewable technologies at home.
As specified above, the basic underlying assumption of the RDD is local random
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Table 3: Discontinuities in observed covariates (using a bandwidth equal to 10)
Discontinuity Robust t-ratio
Employment (1=yes, 0=no) -0.0495 -1.3510
Household size 0.0268 0.4595
Log of annual income of household -0.0559 -1.1514
Qual1 (1=higher education, 0=others) -0.0249** -2.6708
Qual2 (1=first degree, 0=others) -0.0026 -0.1642
Qual3 (1=A-level and related, 0=others) -0.0177 -1.0158
Qual4 (1=O-level and related, 0=others) -0.0099 -0.4533
Qual5 (1=no qualification, 0=others) -0.0058 -0.3258
Note : t-ratios are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors at age level. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Year dummies are used in each regression.
Each row represents a separate regression of Y on each covariate using the optimal polynomial order of
x− 60. This varies with each regression.
assignment around the cutoff age of 60. One way to check the validity of the above re-
sults is to examine whether the covariates are discontinuous around the threshold. To test
the local randomization, we check discontinuities in some observed covariates that may
affect the outcome variable (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). One may argue that at the age
of 60 other things change that could be related to the outcome of interest, for example
employment status. Indeed, women retirement age in UK is 60. In what follows we check
for discontinuity in the following set of variables: employment status, household size,
(log of) annual household income and a set of education indicators. Every covariate is
regressed on D, (x − 60), D ∗ (x − 60) and year dummies under the optimal bandwidth
of 10. As the number of covariates increases, some discontinuities will be statistically
significant by random chance. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), regression of
each covariate is run as seemingly unrelated regression to perform the test of joint dis-
continuities. Table 3 shows only the coefficient of the discontinuity for every covariate.
We see that the covariates are not significantly discontinuous at the cutoff with the excep-
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tion of having higher education, which coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level
(See Figure A.2 to A.9 in Appendix for graphical analysis of these discontinuities using a
bandwidth of 10).
Table 4: First stage of the Residualizing Approach – Regression of renewable energy
installment on observed covariates (using a bandwidth equal to 10)
Coefficient Robust t-ratio
Employment (1=yes, 0=no) -0.0054* -1.9468
Household size 0.0005 0.5544
Log of annual income of household 0.0005 0.8999
Qual1 (1=higher education, 0=others) 0.0239*** 3.8232
Qual2 (1=first degree, 0=others) 0.0122*** 3.2309
Qual3 (1=A-level and related, 0=others) 0.0055* 1.7392
Qual4 (1=O-level and related, 0=others) 0.0056 0.8758
Constant 0.0056 0.8758
Observations 9242
Adjusted R2 0.0027
Note : t-ratios are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors at age level. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Year dummies are used in each regression.
These results indicate that the local randomisation is fairly satisfied. However, and
taking into account the significant discontinuity in higher education, we follow Lee and
Lemieux (2010)) who suggested to incorporate observed covariates into the estimation
of equation (2) by ”residualizing” the propensity of installing renewable energy and then
perform formal RDD on the residuals. Under this method, there are two stages. First,
an OLS regression is run of the outcome variable on observed covariates denoted by W
under bandwidth equal to 10. Estimated coefficients from this first stage regression are
reported in Table 4.
From the regression in Table 4, the predicted renewable energy installment is ob-
tained, which is E(Y |W ) and the residuals, (y − E(Y |W )). Next, the second stage OLS
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regressions is run of equation (2) by replacing Y by (Y − E(Y |W )). In other words, the
portion of the variation in the propensity of renewable energy installment that is driven by
observable household characteristics is netted out leaving the WFP to explain the residual
variation in the outcome.
Table 5: Second Stage of the Residualizing Approach – The effect of the WFP on the
residual propensity of renewable energy installment
Bandwidth
Models without interactions Models with interactions
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.0104** -0.0104** -0.0112* -0.0110** -0.0179**a -0.0275**
[-2.1960] [-2.1950] [-1.7602] [-2.2861] [-2.3443] [-2.3620]
8 -0.0090 -0.0098 -0.0149 -0.0108 -0.0232** -0.0347***a
[-1.0986] [-1.2459] [-1.2679] [-1.4011] [-2.7119] [-5.5389]
6 -0.0142 -0.0148 -0.0069 -0.0166* -0.0239*** -0.0576***a
[-1.3899] [-1.5007] [-0.4920] [-1.8465] [-3.1542] [-12.3979]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a Results from models with optimal polynomial orders of x− 60 choosen by goodness of fit test of Lee and
Card (2008) and AIC.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Year dummies are used in each regression.
Table 5 shows the results of the second stage. We run models with and without inter-
actions using three bandwidths (6, 8 and 10) and three polynomial specifications (linear,
quadratic and cubic). As expected, the residualizing approach improves precision. The
results corroborate previous findings. If anything, the estimated effects are slightly larger
(in absolute term) than in the previous case. The discontinuity of the optimal models
suggests a decrease in renewable technology investments between 1.8 and 5.8 percentage
points. This is a sizeable distortion.
Figure 5 plots the predicted values from regressions in Table 5. There are disconti-
nuities at the cutoff age. Now, with the residualising approach discontinuity estimates are
less affected by the outliers if we compare this with Figure 4.
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Figure 5: Discontinuity in residual propensity to renewable energy installment from esti-
mated models in Table 5
5.1 Falsification Tests
If the mechanism which drives our results of a reduced propensity to install re-
newable energy technologies is the WFP, and in particular its suggestive label, than the
propensity to make other investments in durable goods (i.e., placebo investments) should
not vary by whether the household receives the WFP. This WFP mechanism is tested in a
couple of ways in this section. The first test checks whether receipt of the WFP leads to a
change in the propensity to remodel the kitchen of a household. If the WFP leads house-
holds to alter their decisions around energy investments, it should not alter the propensity
to remodel one’s kitchen. Using data from the English Housing Survey, Table 6 shows
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the estimation results for equation (2) but with an outcome Y which is a dummy variable
equal to one if the household has remodeled their kitchen in the last 12 months and zero
otherwise.7 The estimated effect of the WFP is always statistically insignificant.
Table 6: The effect of the WFP on kitchen remodelling
Bandwidth
Models without interactions Models with interactions
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.013 -0.019
[0.47] [0.49] [-0.13] [0.47] [-0.74] [-0.68]
8 0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.027 0.027
[0.22] [0.28] [-0.15] [0.22] [-1.28] [0.73]
6 -0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.009 -0.007 0.058
[-0.13] [-0.38] [0.07] [-0.52] [-0.31] [0.86]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors at age level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Income, educational qualification, employment and year dummies
are included in each regression.
Next, an analysis of whether the WFP led to a change in the probability of investing
in some common durable goods – Colour TV, Freezer, Washing Machine, Tumble Dryer,
Dish Washer, Micro Wave and Car – is tested. Again, equation (2) is re-estimated with
an outcome of a dummy variable equal to one if the household has purchased any of the
above items in the last 12 months and zero otherwise. Most of the results in Table 7 are
not only insignificant, but also change signs of discontinuities (sometimes positive and
sometimes negative).
Taken together, these two tests support the claim that the mechanism behind the
change in the propensity to install renewable technologies found in Table 2 is due to
the WFP and not a result of income effects or a change in age across the two groups.
7An alternative placebo outcome of the propensity to remodel the bathroom was also estimated. The
results are equivalent to those presented in Table 6 and are available by request.
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Specifically, this consitutes further evidence that the WFP is seen as price subsidy for
energy.
Table 7: Discontinuities in probabilities of buying other durable goods
Colour Washing Tumble Dish Micro
Bandwidth TV Freezer Machine Dryer Washer Wave Car
10 0.0134 0.0029 -0.0338 0.0234 0.0023 0.0172 0.0095
[0.2756] [0.1925] [-1.2383] [1.1988] [0.0988] [0.6212] [0.6012]
8 0.0572 -0.0024 0.0028 0.0089 -0.0101 0.0491* 0.0057
[1.4006] [-0.1493] [0.1518] [0.5101] [-0.4684] [1.8963] [0.3747]
6 0.0736 0.0164 0.0403** -0.0004 0.0234 0.0636** 0.0120
[1.5089] [0.9098] [2.2063] [-0.0316] [0.9362] [2.2659] [0.6908]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Income, educational qualification, employment and year dummies
are included in each regression.
Quadratic models allowing different slopes in either side of the cutoff age are run.
Table 8: Discontinuities in the probability of renewable energy installment at two different
cutoff ages 55 and 65
Cutoff Age=55 Cutoff Age=65
Bandwidth Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 0.0068 0.0034 -0.0066 0.0026 0.0072 0.0010
[1.6570] [1.2284] [-1.0331] [0.3603] [0.6319] [0.0830]
8 0.0087** -0.0055 0.0044 0.0024 0.0109 -0.0221*
[2.1467] [-1.2112] [0.9651] [0.3027] [0.7902] [-1.8410]
6 0.0026 -0.0016 0.0061 0.0113 -0.0126 -0.0080
[0.9664] [-0.2887] [0.7861] [1.0431] [-1.3782] [-0.6742]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Income, educational qualification, employment and year dummies
are included in each regression.
Regression models consider different slopes in either side of cutoff ages.
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Similarly, if the WFP is the mechanism behind the reduction in the probability to
install renewable energy, there should not be any significant discontinuities in the proba-
bility of renewable energy installments at other age levels where receipt of the WFP does
not change. Equation (2) is re-estimated with a treatment variable, D that equals one if
the age of the oldest member of the household is (i) 55 and older or (ii) 65 and older.
This specification will reveal whether a discontinuity in the propensity to install renew-
able energy exists at age 55 or 65, where households’ eligibility of receiving WFP does
not change.8 Table 8 shows that most estimates of the discontinuity at 55 or 65 are statis-
tically insignificant and those that are significant change between positive and negative.
This result is consistent with WFP leading to a change in propensity to invest in renewable
energy.
6 Further Investigation
Next, an investigation is performed into which groups of households play a key
role in the results obtained above. One may argue that investments in durable goods,
such as renewable energy, vary by ages of household members. Younger members will
have a longer life expectancy which implies a longer stream of benefits from renewable
energy installments compared to older members.9 In the analyses above, the assignment
variable controls for the effect of age of oldest member and ignores the age of other
members of the household. In Table 9, we show estimates of the effect of the WFP
(values of ρ) for two groups of households: without members below 45 years of age and
with at least one member below that age. The first category indicates a household with
lower life expectancy than that of the second category of households. The propensity
8Beatty et al. (2011) chosen 66 age level in place of 65 to avoid the effect of retirement, which occurs at
65. However, in our view if we change one year age, results should not be changed drastically.
9A counter argument could be made that the value of the renewable energy benefits are capitalized into
the house and thus age of the homeowner does not impact expected benefits.
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Table 9: Discontinuities in the probability of renewable energy installment by age com-
position of households
No member below 45 At least one member below 45
Bandwidth Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.0179** -0.0248*** -0.0374*** 0.0019 -0.0063 -0.0110
[-2.4434] [-3.1521] [-7.5280] [0.2030] [-0.4666] [-0.6362]
8 -0.0168** -0.0323*** -0.0344*** 0.0010 -0.0087 -0.0301*
[-2.1228] [-5.1147] [-4.3309] [0.0922] [-0.5451] [-1.9837]
6 -0.0259*** -0.0246*** -0.0586*** -0.0008 -0.0201 -0.0562***
[-3.4107] [-3.3757] [-9.4088] [-0.0613] [-1.3378] [-4.4257]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The sample is restricted to owners only. Income, educational qualification, employment and year dummies
are included in each regression.
Regression models consider different slopes in either side of the cutoff age.
of renewable energy installments is statistically lower for households in receipt of WFP
without members younger than 45 relative to those household not in receipt (but within
the bandwidth) without members younger than 45. The results comparing households in
receipt of the WFP with at least one member younger than 45 to those not in receipt but
also with at least one member younger than 45 are mostly insignificant. These results
imply that the household composed exclusively of older citizens change their decisions
concerning renewable energy installment once in receipt of the WFP.
Finally, Table 10 reveals how the effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment
on all households, whether they own the house or not. It is potentially more difficult
for a renter to convince their landlord to install renewable energy technologies, however
the results given in Table 10 are quite similar to those in Table 2, albeit less sizeable.
All estimates are negative and the estimates that correspond to the Lee and Card (2008)
goodness of fit test are all statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficients in
Table 10 are similar to that of Table 2.
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Table 10: The effect of the WFP on renewable energy installment for owners and renters
(ρ)
Bandwidth
Models without interaction Models with interaction
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 -0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0069 -0.0078* -0.0099*a -0.0131**
[-1.6440] [-1.7011] [-1.0093] [-1.8434] [-1.8589] [-2.1007]
8 -0.0063 -0.0068 -0.0080 -0.0074 -0.0119** -0.0175**a
[-1.1905] [-1.3716] [-1.0493] [-1.5794] [-2.1241] [-2.9081]
6 -0.0087 -0.0089 -0.0014 -0.0100 -0.0112*a -0.0376***
[-1.2893] [-1.3841] [-0.1553] [-1.7359] [-1.8872] [-8.6413]
Note : t-ratios in brackets are estimated from cluster adjusted robust standard errors at age level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a Optimal polynomial orders of x − 60 according to the goodness of fit test suggested by Lee and Card
(2008).
Year dummies are included in each regression.
The optimal bandwidth is equal to 10 according to the cross validation method suggested by Imbens and
Lemieux (2008).
7 Conclusions
When cash transfers are labelled, does the labelling affect household decisions on
related goods? While there is growing evidence building that the label of a cash transfer
alters recipients decisions on purchases of the labelled good, the analysis here is the first
to answer the question above. The answer has broad implications for nearly every policy.
Many of the most common transfers have labels which suggest a use for the transfer, such
as food stamps and child benefit.
This analysis tests whether households substitute away from renewable energy tech-
nologies, which are more energy efficient, when receiving a cash transfer, the WFP, which
primes them to purchase fuel. Using a simple model of household production of energy
services which can be met by fuel or more efficient capital, it is shown that when house-
holds receive a fuel labelled cash transfer it can lead to an increase in the amount of fuel
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used Beatty et al., 2011 and a substitution away from more efficient capital. This theo-
retical result is confirmed when taken to data. The sharp eligibility criteria of the WFP
allows for an estimation of the casual impact of the WFP on propensity to install renew-
able energy with a RDD. In other words, the effect of the WFP is for households to choose
energy sources which pollute more. Results using several bandwidth and functional forms
agree that on average WFP recipients are around 2.7 percentage points less likely to in-
stall renewable energy technologies. This is the middle point of a range of values that
go from 1 to 5 percentage points. The results are not only statistically significant, but
also economically relevant. Our models predict that a minimum of 42% up to 78% of
households whose oldest member turns 60 would have invested in renewable energy but
refrain to do so after receiving the WFP. Considering the universality of the transfer, this
is a considerable number.
The WFP mechanism is confirmed by null results on falsification tests. Households
do not alter their propensity to invest in their homes or other durable goods, such as
kitchen remodelling or purchase of a new car, and placebo cutoff ages show no change in
installation of renewable energy.
Given that renewable technologies are one way to ensure that a household can afford
to heat its home, these results imply that the label of the transfer nudges households
towards a less socially efficient outcome in which a desired amount of heating is achieved
with more pollution at the expense of cleaner renewable energy installments. Ultimately,
the transfer is counterproductive to the ultimate goal of the policy as it moves households
away from one way to achieve the goal itself. Additionally, concerns over greenhouse
gas emissions, energy security, and the competitiveness of the UK economy, have led to
the recent implementation of a number of renewable energy policies. The evidence given
here suggests that the effectiveness of renewable policies is being hampered by the WFP
label. This issue may be straightforward to remedy; rename the transfer to something that
primes the household to think about energy efficiency or renewables, such as the Winter
28
Renewable Energy Payment.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Optimal polynomial order selection using the goodness of fit test suggested by
Lee and Card (2008)
Estimated F Critical F Optimal?
Bandwidth=10 Linear 1.52 F (J-K=18, N-J=10595)=1.57 Yes
Linear with interactions 1.59 F (J-K=17, N-J=10595)=1.57 No
Quadratic 1.61 F (J-K=17, N-J=10595)=1.57 No
Quadratic with interactions 1.47 F (J-K=15, N-J=10595)=1.67 Yes
Cubic 1.71 F (J-K=16, N-J=8641)=1.67 No
Cubic with interactions 1.53 F (J-K=13, N-J=8641)=1.67 Yes
Bandwidth=8 Linear 1.81 F (J-K=14, N-J=8641)=1.67 No
Linear with interactions 1.83 F (J-K=13, N-J=8641)=1.67 No
Quadratic 1.90 F (J-K=13, N-J=8641)=1.67 No
Quadratic with interactions 1.74 F (J-K=11, N-J=8641)=1.83 Yes
Cubic 1.99 F (J-K=12, N-J=8641)=1.75 No
Cubic with interactions 1.61 F (J-K=9, N-J=8641)=1.88 Yes
Bandwidth=6 Linear 2.17 F (J-K=10, N-J=6684)=1.83 No
Linear with interactions 2.24 F (J-K=9, N-J=6684)=1.88 No
Quadratic 2.39 F (J-K=9, N-J=6684)=1.88 No
Quadratic with interactions 1.65 F (J-K=7, N-J=6684)=2.01 Yes
Cubic 2.45 F (J-K=8, N-J=6684)=1.94 No
Cubic with interactions 1.19 F (J-K=5, N-J=6684)=2.21 Yes
Note : According to Lee and Card (2008), goodness of fit test (where K is the number of parameters in the restricted model and J is
the number of age cells used in the regression) chooses the optimal polynomial order of x− 60 when the estimated F is less than the
critical F at the 5% significance level. The last column indicates models with optimal polynomial orders. This test also reveals that
under 6, 8 and 10 bandwidths, quadratic, cubic models with interactions are optimal models.
Table A.2: Optimal polynomial order selection using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC)
Bandwidth
Models without interaction Models with interaction
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear Quadratic Cubic
10 51459.28 51461.277 51463.271 51461.028 51459.962 51461.885
8 40110.064 40111.517 40112.675 40110.624 40109.958 40109.27
6 29511.083 29512.873 29512.947 29511.568 29506.899 29505.339
Note : The optimal polynomial order is the one with minimum AIC value.
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Figure A.1: Plotting cross validation against bandwidth for choosing the optimal band-
width in Table 2
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Figure A.2: Discontinuity in employment of the oldest member
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Figure A.3: Discontinuity in household size
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Figure A.4: Discontinuity in log of income
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Figure A.5: Discontinuity in obtaining higher education
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Figure A.6: Discontinuity in obtaining first degree
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Figure A.7: Discontinuity in obtaining A-level
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Figure A.8: Discontinuity in obtaining O-level
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Figure A.9: Discontinuity in having no qualifications
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